Proceedings of GREAT Day
Volume 2010

Article 18

2011

Immanuel Kant, John Hick, and the “SoulMaking”Theodicy
Gian Martinelli
SUNY Geneseo

Follow this and additional works at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Martinelli, Gian (2011) "Immanuel Kant, John Hick, and the “Soul-Making”Theodicy," Proceedings of GREAT Day: Vol. 2010 , Article
18.
Available at: https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2010/iss1/18

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the GREAT Day at KnightScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Proceedings of
GREAT Day by an authorized editor of KnightScholar. For more information, please contact KnightScholar@geneseo.edu.

Martinelli: Immanuel Kant, John Hick, and the “Soul-Making”Theodicy

Immanuel Kant, John Hick, and the “Soul-Making”
Theodicy

Submitted by: Gian Martinelli
defense by showing that, not only are we unique
in having the ability to make moral or immoral
choices, but also that we are the only beings
who must progress toward goodness through our
free will. Indeed, Kant maintains that “in this
earthly world there is only progress.”cxii An
individual’s continual procession toward
goodness and happiness is entirely dependent on
his adherence to the moral law. Moreover, we
should strive toward goodness and happiness
even though they are not “things to be
possessed” in this world.cxiii
In solving the problem of evil, Kant
develops God’s purpose in making the
attainment of goodness and happiness so
burdensome. Kant poses the objection that, if
these things are unattainable in this world, and
we still try to obtain them through the moral
law, then the conclusion that God wills evil in
the world is inevitable. In refuting the
objection, he claims that “God wills the
elimination of evil through the all-powerful
development of the germ toward perfection. He
wills that evil be removed through the progress
toward good.”cxiv Here, Kant connects the
purpose of laboring through the moral law and
God’s holiness. It is God’s holy and benevolent
intention that we continually labor ourselves
toward happiness and goodness through our
adherence to the moral law. Since our immoral
actions are the source of evil, God wills that we
eliminate our tendencies to disregard the moral
law through a persistent development of our
predisposition to the good.
In this way, Kant’s notion of happiness
becomes something contrary to its common
definition. For Kant, happiness in this life is
not mere enjoyment or pleasure. Instead, “it is
labor, difficulty, effort, the prospect of

In his “Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine
of Religion,” Immanuel Kant considers and
attempts to solve the problem of evil by
combining many of the traditional theodicies.
He focuses particularly on adherence to the
moral law in order to work toward being worthy
of happiness. For Kant, the fact that happiness
becomes a labor toward peacefulness becomes a
sort of indicator of God’s goodness. This
strongly resembles John Hick’s “soul-making”
theodicy. Hick claims that humans must deal
with evil in this world in order to become
stronger and more suitable for a union with God
in the afterlife. In both cases, the problem of
evil is apparently solved by emphasizing God’s
goodness in encouraging the endurance of moral
choices in humans through the burdens of the
world. In this paper, I will not only identify
problems with the general “soul-making”
theodicy, but also the inconsistency of Kant’s
formulation with the rest of his philosophy.
In his attempt to reconcile God with the
evil in the world, Kant concentrates his defense
on the primacy of morality. In fact, Kant thinks
that these “considerations will settle the matter
for us.”cxi Through an examination of our free
will and morality, he thinks evil will be placed
in a proper light. Kant claims that, as humans,
we have the unique capability of choosing to act
in accordance with the moral law. Before Kant
delves entirely into his notion of working
toward happiness, he emphasizes our free will,
which is the foundation on which our journey
toward this worthiness to be happy rests.
Furthermore, Kant points out that, “among the
many creatures, the human being is the only one
who has to work for perfections and for the
goodness of his character, producing them from
within himself.” He lays the groundwork for his
132
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they attempt to justify our epistemic and
ontological claims concerning God by securing
His attribute of being all-good. In a successful
theodicy, we can know that God is all-good and
He exists, which is what Kant is trying to
accomplish. This creates a strong tension
between speculative and practical reason. It
thus brings up the question of whether Kant is
justified in supplying such a traditional
theodicy. Again, I acknowledge that he claims
to be using practical reason through all of this,
but he seems to blend practical reason with
elements of theoretical and speculative reason.
By 1791, Kant appears to have
acknowledged this tension in his theodicy in his
essay entitled “On the Miscarriage of All
Philosophical Trials in Theodicy.” In this work,
Kant explains how every theodicy of the past
has failed, including his own formulation. He
recapitulates his old argument by stating that
“an arduous and sorrowful state in the present
life must without exception precede that hopedfor superabundant blessedness—a state in which
we are to become worthy of that future glory
precisely through our struggles with
adversities.”cxx This is no longer satisfying for
Kant. He seems to be a bit more skeptical of the
“soul-making” claim’s value as a theodicy. He
objects that this “soul-making” claim “can
indeed be pretended but in no way can there be
insight into it.”cxxi I think this is Kant’s way of
conceding that a theodicy of this sort cannot be
given exclusively via practical reason. Kant
revokes his theodicy along with the other
theodicies of the past by claiming that, since
they are not wholly practical, they fail. As an
alternative, Kant offers that “the demonstration
of [moral wisdom] must be carried out totally a
priori, hence in no way be founded on the
experience of what goes on in the world.”cxxii In
other words, God is good based on our wholly a
priori practical deductions from the moral law,
which prevail regardless of any a posteriori evil
in the world.
Recently, the pre-1791 Kantian defense
of God’s goodness has been revived in John
Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy. According to
Hick, human souls are subjected to the evils in
this world in order to become more adequate for
a union with God. Like Kant, Hick thinks that

tranquility and the striving toward the
achievement of this idea which is happiness and
a proof already of God’s benevolence.”cxv Even
though evil is in the world, it does not conflict
with the concept of God as all-good and allpowerful. God, who is also all-knowing, wills
what is best for us, which turns out to be a
difficult progression toward perfection. In a
way, God wills the evil, or “ill,” that goes into
this progression as “a special arrangement for
leading the human being toward happiness.”cxvi
For Kant, this is ultimately a good thing.
Overcoming ill not only allows humans to get
closer to the best moral state, but also helps
them to learn how to get to that state along the
way. As Kant puts it, “ill is necessary if the
human being is to have a wish and an aspiration
toward a better state, and at the same time to
learn how to strive to become worthy of it.”cxvii
While Kant’s theodicy may be a genuine
attempt to reconcile evil with a benevolent God,
it is inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.
Throughout Kant’s theodicy in the “Lectures on
the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion,” Kant
seems to blur his distinction between theoretical
and practical reason. In the first Critique, Kant
defines theoretical knowledge as “speculative if
it concerns an object, or those concepts of an
object, which cannot be reached in any
experience.”cxviii Claims concerning God are
speculative, since God is beyond our
experience. Of course, Kant maintains that, in
his lectures, he’s basing all of his theology on
practical reason, which allows him to talk of
God strictly in terms of morality. Practical
reason is concerned with “what ought to be” the
case as opposed to theoretical reason’s enquiry
into “what is” the case.cxix
With these definitions, I question
whether Kant is relying solely on practical
reason in his theodicy. Indeed, this solution
seems to be quite theoretical. Granted, Kant is
discussing the centrality of the practical in
human beings, but he’s also discussing “what is
the case” for God by reconciling all of the
traditional attributes of God with evil in the
world. In fact, it seems that the very nature of
most traditional theodicies is theoretical. These
theodicies defend and clarify aspects of the
concept of the greatest Object. That is to say,
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philosophy of religion. In his lectures, he
establishes that God wills that we endure and
eliminate evil through a progression toward a
perfect adherence to the moral law. Due to the
apparent blur between theoretical and practical
reason as well as other difficulties in his
theodicy, Kant revokes this in his 1791 essay by
claiming that the only real theodicy can be
accomplished a priori through practical reason.
With John Hick’s adaptation of Kant’s older
argument, the “soul-making” theodicy appears
to be clearer and more convincing. Ultimately,
however, the argument is riddled with problems
regardless of whether it is taken in the context
of Kantian philosophy.

the endurance of moral beings through evil
“represents the perfecting of man, the
fulfillment of God’s purpose for humanity.”cxxiii
God is justified in retaining a world with so
much evil because it allows for the growth of an
individual’s soul into something that is
simultaneously glorifying to God and
appropriate for a union with Him. Kant makes a
similar claim when he says that ill is in the
world so that humans can progress toward a sort
of worthiness to be happy. As Hick puts it, the
world must be viewed “as an environment in
which moral beings may be fashioned, through
their own free insights and responses, into
children of God.”cxxiv Kant claims that humans
need ill to endure toward happiness through the
moral law, but this tranquility is unattainable in
the world. This seems to imply that a universal
and perfect adherence to the moral law is simply
not possible. Similarly, Hick claims that there is
no correlation between the moral journey of an
individual and a “progressive improvement in
the moral state of the world.”cxxv
Even if we pardon the blur between
speculative and practical reason in Kant’s
formulation, we can still identify problems with
the general “soul-making” theodicy. First, there
are countless situations throughout history
which seem to reflect genuinely unjustifiable
suffering even from Hick’s perspective. The
Holocaust is the most obvious case. Why was
such catastrophic suffering arbitrarily placed on
a group of people? Surely their souls could
have been developed under less suffering. In
contrast, there are large groups of immoral
people who pass through life seemingly
unscathed by suffering. If God uses evil to
make souls better, why is the playing field not
level? If there are these immoral people who
pass through their lives with very little
suffering, how are continents of starving
children justified? This imbalance creates a
tension in the conception of evil as something
individuals work through for happiness or
spiritual growth. Indeed, one could argue that
God could have made a more adequate and less
extreme environment for moral and spiritual
development.
An analysis of Kant’s morally-focused
theodicy reflects its importance in the
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